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In this work, Jill Gordon presents a contribu-
tion to the scholarship that must be read by anyone 
interested in the subject of erotic love, eros, and 
related issues in Plato. The book is written in a clear 
style which will be accessible to undergraduates, 
and it contains insights and new interpretations 
which will challenge and be useful to more advanced 
scholars as well. Though the lack of a conclusion 
would seem to indicate that her book is not primarily 
written in the form of an argument, Gordon wants 
to defend several theses. The main goal of the book 
is to highlight the significance of those passages in 
the Platonic corpus having to do with eros, which are 
outside of what are traditionally considered Plato’s 
erotic dialogues, namely, Symposium, Phaedrus, 
Charmides, Lysis, Alcibiades I, and perhaps Republic 
(1). While she will have certain things to say about 
these dialogues, especially Phaedrus and Alcibiades 
I, she will focus on the role of eros in Timaeus, 
Cratylus, Protagoras, Parmenides, Theaetetus, and 
Phaedo. Within these dialogues her main aim is to 
show how eros is part of our divine origin, and how 
through proper cultivation of eros we may return 
to that original state. The proper cultivation will 
involve, first, becoming aware of one’s ignorance 
and adopting an interrogative outlook. Second, it 
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will require the courage to undertake a long and 
difficult task whose outcome is uncertain. It will 
also require guides who know the soul, and who 
are adept both at matchmaking and leading their 
charges to self-knowledge. And finally she addresses 
the connection between eros and the memory of our 
original state to which we strive to return. Thus 
Gordon takes us on a circular journey beginning with 
our divine origins in the Timaeus, then descending to 
the difficulties of our embodied state in the Cratylus, 
Protagoras, Parmenides and Theaetetus, and then fi-
nally returning to our nostos, our journey home, and 
re-attainment of that original state, in the Phaedo. 
In the first chapter, Gordon is primarily con-
cerned to establish two points. The first is that, 
contrary to the traditional reading of the Timaeus, 
eros is part of our original noetic condition and thus 
eros, or at least the capacity for it, is part of the 
Demiurge’s contribution to the human soul, as oppo-
sed to being the work of the lesser gods. The second 
and for Gordon related point is that eros is not an 
emotion and it is not part of the epithumetic desires, 
which at least in Republic Book IV constitute the 
third part of the soul. Gordon wants to establish the 
latter point because, among other reasons, if eros 
were an emotion or among the epithumetic desires 
then it would be part of the work of the lesser gods 
in the Timaeus. And, according to Gordon, this would 
imply that eros is not due to the creative activity 
of the Demiurge himself and therefore that it is not 
part of our original noetic condition. 
Her main argument for the view that the 
Demiurge is responsible for eros in the human 
soul revolves around the interpretation of two 
passages, Timaeus 42a-b and 69c-e, which seem to 
say much the same thing. Both seem to describe 
how the affections, such as fear, anger, and eros, 
come to be in the human soul in connection with 
its embodiment. At 69c-e the introduction of these 
affections (if I may use that word) is clearly the work 
of the lesser gods. The crucial question is whether 
the earlier passage, 42a-b, likewise describes the 
work of the lesser gods. According to Gordon, the 
traditional interpretation accepts that it does, but 
Gordon argues that 42a-b describes the Demiurge’s 
own work, and thus that eros, or the capacity for 
eros, is part of our original noetic and divine con-
dition. Gordon presents three reasons for believing 
this. First, 42a-b “occurs before the demiurge has 
handed off responsibility for the mortal soul to 
the lesser gods. It presents itself as part of the 
demiurge’s long set of instructions and descriptions 
of his work, which precedes what he assigns to the 
lesser gods” (16). Second, the affections at 69c-e 
are presented in a negative light, while they are 
not so presented at 42a-b. And third, 69c-e occurs 
after the “new beginning” at 48a-b, where Timaeus 
switches from speaking about the causal role of 
intellect to that of necessity. 
In chapters 2 through 5 Gordon explores the 
four main aspects of eros, which emerge in the con-
text of the self-cultivation required to achieve the 
return our original noetic state. Chapter 2 mainly 
concerns the importance of questioning and the 
interrogative state for eros. She begins with the 
Cratylus where a homophonic connection is made 
between the Greek words for ‘hero,’ ‘eros,’ and ‘ques-
tioning’ (ἥρως, ἔρως, ἐρωτάω). Heroes occupy 
a position between the gods and mortals, much 
as Diotima describes eros in the Symposium. And 
Gordon ties Socrates’ claim to knowledge of erotics 
in Symposium to his expertise in questioning. By 
asking questions, Socrates shows his interlocutors 
that they do not know what they thought they 
knew, and thus he instills in them the erotic desire 
to know the truth. Chapter 3 discusses the courage 
required to engage in erotic questioning and in the 
philosophic pursuit generally. Here Gordon takes 
Parmenides as her starting point, claiming that 
“eros is a significant philosophical theme” in that 
dialogue (86). Her grounds for saying so revolve 
mainly around the fear Parmenides and Socrates 
share both about the range of the Forms, and 
about the problems of discontinuity between the 
realm of the Forms and the concrete realm. This 
fear is to be overcome by the philosophical exercise 
exemplified by Parmenides in the second half of the 
dialogue. Gordon highlights the erotic dimension 
of gymnastic training in Ancient Greece, and thus 
connects the second half of the Parmenides with 
an erotic desire which in some way overcomes the 
discontinuity between the concrete and abstract 
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realms. 
In the fourth and fifth chapters Gordon tackles 
the related issues of matchmaking, self-knowledge, 
and the necessity of having a good leader or teacher. 
In the Theaetetus Socrates reveals that matchmaking 
is part of his maieutic art, and he uses his knowledge 
of these matters to demonstrate that Theodorus is 
not a good match for Theaetetus, because, among 
other reasons, Theodorus does not have a good 
understanding of Theaetetus’ soul. The significance 
of good matchmaking becomes apparent when we 
turn to the Alcibiades, where Socrates reveals to 
Alcibiades that he needs a good teacher in order to 
achieve self-knowledge, and that in fact Socrates 
himself would be his best teacher because Socrates 
understands Alcibiades’ soul. In chapter 5 Gordon 
takes on several of Schleiermacher’s arguments 
against the authenticity of the Alcibiades. She argues 
that self-knowledge can only be achieved in the 
company of another, and that it is best achieved in 
the company of a lover who knows one’s soul. Self-
-knowledge is crucial in order to discover what one 
truly desires and loves. Thus in helping the beloved 
achieve self-knowledge the lover also redirects the 
beloved’s eros towards its true objects. 
Finally, in the last chapter Gordon addresses 
the connection between eros and memory in helping 
us return to our original noetic state in the Phaedo. 
Here she highlights the example of seeing the lyre 
or cloak of the beloved as an explanation of the 
connection between eros and memory. And she chal-
lenges the tradition according to which recollection 
is a purely mental, rational endeavor. Instead Gordon 
highlights the importance of the senses, of actually 
seeing the cloak or lyre or equal sticks, in the act 
of remembering our original condition. 
Clearly it is only possible to give the broadest 
outline Gordon’s work here, and many of her most 
rewarding and challenging insights and interpreta-
tions have been left for the reader to discover. At 
this point, however, I turn to making three evalua-
tions before concluding. 
First, while I agree that there is evidence 
in the Platonic corpus for the view that eros is 
part of our original noetic condition, I find myself 
un-persuaded by Gordon’s interpretation of the 
Timaeus. While not claiming any expertise on that 
dialogue it seems that on a straightforward reading 
of Timaeus 42a-b, the Demiurge is merely explaining 
to the human souls what will happen to them once 
they are embodied and receive affections such as 
anger, fear, and love. The passage is preceded by 
the following: “And putting each in a sort of chariot 
he showed them the nature of the universe and told 
them the ordained laws… (καὶ ἐμβιβάσας ὡς ἐς 
ὄχημα τὴν τοῦ παντὸς φύσιν ἔδειξεν, νόμους 
τε τοὺς εἱμαρμένους εἶπεν αὐταῖς, 41e).” As I 
read the text, everything that follows until 42d is 
part of this explanation by the Demiurge to the hu-
man souls about what will happen to them, namely 
that they will receive affections when embodied and 
that they must control these if they wish to regain 
their original divine state. This interpretation is 
supported at the end of the passage where Timaeus 
states, “Prescribing all these things to them, in order 
that he might be blameless for the evil of each… 
(διαθεσμοθετήσας δὲ πάντα αὐτοῖς ταῦτα, 
ἵνα τῆς ἔπειτα εἴη κακίας ἑκάστων ἀναίτιος, 
42d).” So, I see no reason to take 42a-b as referring 
to the Demiurge’s own creative activity. It seems, 
rather, that he is only explaining to them how to 
live once they received the affections by necessity 
upon being embodied. And 69c-e further specifies 
that the embodiment and consequent reception of 
the affections is the work of the lesser gods. This is 
not, however, to say that Gordon is wrong to believe 
that eros is part of our original noetic condition. 
It is only to say that I think one could find better 
support for such a thesis elsewhere in the Platonic 
corpus, e.g. from Symposium where Socrates/ 
Diotima specifically speaks about the possibility of 
continuing to feel eros even when one possesses the 
good (Symposium 200c-d, cf. 206a-7a).
Second, at times I found myself remaining 
skeptical about Gordon’s claims regarding the 
meanings of certain Greek words and concepts, in 
particular the claim that they have erotic connota-
tions. She claims, for example that “the horse was 
used in old comedy as a phallic stand-in” (101), and 
thus that a possible interpretation of Parmenides’ 
reference to feeling like an old horse at Parmenides 
136e-7a is that it is “a playful and raunchy way of 
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expressing that he is being asked to “get it up” 
again in old age…” (102). Even if it is true that the 
horse is used as a phallic stand-in in old comedy, I 
do not see that it follows from this that the horse 
always has erotic connotations, and so I see no 
reason to impute such connotations to this part of 
the Parmenides. I feel much the same way about her 
claims regarding ‘persuasion’ (Πειθώ, 34-7, 118-
19), ‘yielding’ (ἡσσάομαι, 36), ‘gymnastic training’ 
(γυμνάζω, 98), ‘leading’ (προάγω, 168), among 
others. Even if these concepts sometimes have erotic 
connotations, it does not follow that they always 
have them – or at least more work is needed to 
establish that they do – and so the reader remains 
skeptical about the inference that they have such 
connotations in the passages in question.  
Finally, I would like to present a criticism 
which will reveal my biases most of all. And this 
is that for me the question of eros in Plato is es-
sentially bound up with the questions of goodness 
and beauty. In this sense, I think, the strength of 
Gordon’s work is also its weakness. For in focusing 
on what are traditionally not considered erotic dia-
logues, it seems to me that certain central issues 
concerning eros are omitted, which are addressed in 
the traditional erotic dialogues, especially Sympo-
sium and Phaedrus. In the Symposium it is a major 
revelation that the object of eros is goodness, not 
beauty (204d-e). And eros is defined as the desire 
to possess the good forever (206a). And yet Gordon 
says very little about beauty and even less about 
goodness. We may infer that, for Gordon, the good 
which is the proper object of eros is the return to 
the original noetic condition, and no doubt this is 
true. But the question remains, why is that original 
noetic condition good? The Symposium explicitly 
addresses and rejects the idea that return to original 
conditions is good merely because it is a return to 
original conditions. This was Aristophanes’ thesis. 
Aristophanes argued that the goal of eros was to 
return us to our original condition of wholeness with 
our other halves. But Diotima explicitly rejects this 
thesis at 205e. We would not want original condi-
tions unless those original conditions were good, 
and thus we cannot assume that original conditions 
are always good. This is something which has to be 
determined. So the question remains, why is our 
original noetic condition good?
I have no doubt that Gordon can answer all 
these questions soundly. And good work in this field 
should generate controversy and disagreement. In 
this book Gordon has contributed greatly to the 
understanding of eros in Plato, and in particular 
to the appreciation of the significance of the topic 
outside what are traditionally held to be the erotic 
dialogues. And it is expected that more research 
will arise out of the important issues she raises in 
this work. 
Recebido em junho de 2014,
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